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TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

XUEPENG LIU*
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Abstract
This paper studies the growth effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs), taking into
account the WTO participation of RTA members. Assuming smaller preference margins
of RTAs for WTO members than non-members, I show in a model a stronger growth
effect of RTAs for non-WTO members than that for WTO members. Based on a
comprehensive set of 270 RTAs and a large panel dataset covering 177 countries over the
period of 1960-2007, the regression results show that RTAs promote growth for nonWTO members, while their growth effect is insignificantly different from zero for WTO
members. This implies that the complementarity beetween the two approaches of trade
liberalization in promoting economic growth is so far limited.

[Key words]: regional trade agreements, WTO, economic growth
[JEL Classification]: F1, O4

*

Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, #0403,
Burruss Bldg #4, Room 322, 1000 Chastain Rd., Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA; Email: xliu6@kennesaw.edu; Tel:
(470)578-6605; Fax: (770)499-3209. I thank Devashish Mitra, Emanuel Ornelas, David J. Richardson, and
participants at the Midwest International Trade Meetings at Vanderbilt University and the seminars at Syracuse
University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for helpful comments, and Jingying Yang for capable research
assistance.

“RTAs can foster economic growth and development. But such an outcome is dependent
upon various factors, including net trade-creation, an improved regulatory environment,
enhanced investment flows and technology transfers. … A key question is whether they
are a building block to non-discrimination or a permanent feature of the trading landscape.
Concern has been expressed that some RTAs reflect a defensive necessity aimed at
maintaining access to larger markets, locking out competition from other MFN suppliers
and locking in investment. If such trends are sustained and not counterbalanced by a
successful outcome of the Doha Round, the contribution of an ever-growing number of
overlapping RTAs to the economic progress of both parties and non-parties could be
negative.” (Italics added)
— WTO, Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations
(WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.2, June 27, 2006)
1. INTRODUCTION
It is nearly a consensus among economists that free trade is generally a good thing. Many
countries, especially developing countries, regard trade as a means to raise income levels and
living standards.1 They expect from trade not only static gains, but also dynamic gains related to
productivity and technological improvement. Countries have adopted various approaches to
liberalize trade. Aside from unilateral trade liberalization and some non-reciprocal agreements
such as the General System of Preferences (GSP), freer trade is mainly achieved through
reciprocal international trade negotiations, either multilaterally under the GATT/WTO
(hereinafter WTO) or bilaterally through regional trade agreements (RTAs). Most of the world
trade today is among the WTO members. RTAs, as a major exception to the WTO
nondiscrimination rule, have proliferated especially since the 1990s. By 2010, every country
except Mongolia is a party to at least one RTA, and the share of intra-RTA trade among the
world total trade had increased from 28% in 1990 to 50.8% in 2008 (WTO 2011, p64).
Faster economic growth is among the ultimate objectives of trade liberalization of any
form including RTAs, as frequently heard from government officials in both developed and
developing countries. For example, as reported on the NAFTA by The New York Times
(8/13/1992), “President Bush said the agreement … protects America’s place in the world by
creating jobs and economic growth. … Mexico saw the agreement as a symbolic stride in its
march away from decades of protectionism and poverty.” Recently, many African countries
formed RTAs with neighboring countries in hopes of faster economic growth. As a Rwandan
government official said, “Integration is our lifeline. … The Rwandan market is small so all our
1

Some economists, however, doubt the positive trade-growth linkage (see, e.g., Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000).
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strategies are closely aligned to becoming a driving force in the regional economic bloc”
(Financial Times, 9/22/2009). However, others doubt the positive development effects of RTAs
in the region. As a commissioner of the African Union said, “Regional integration has played
only a marginal role in most of our development.”2 Although economic development is a major
impetus behind regional integration, its effects are yet to be seen. For example, Mexico failed to
register fast economic growth after the NAFTA despite the boom in Mexico-U.S. trade.
Conversely, as late entrants to RTAs, East Asian countries have been growing faster than the rest
of the world. Therefore, examining the growth effects of RTAs is of great relevance to the
current debate on regionalism.
In this paper, I study the effect of trade agreements on economic growth. Given the large
existing literature on economic growth and trade in general, however, what are the benefits of
studying the growth effects of trade agreements in particular? First, most of the existing studies
on trade and growth use trade volume (e.g., openness) or trade policy variables (e.g., tariffs),
which are usually the results of various approaches to trade liberalization. Studies using these
measures cannot disentangle the growth effects of one approach to trade liberalization from
others (e.g., the bilateral and multilateral approaches under the RTAs and the WTO,
respectively), and are silent on the degree of their complementarity.3 Second, there might be
something peculiar about trade agreements that benefit their members beyond trade or render the
beneficial effects of trade ineffective. The analysis in this paper captures not only the effects of
trade agreements on growth through trade, but also their effects through many non-trade
channels.
Despite the importance, the growth effects of RTAs do not receive enough attention from
researchers. As noticed earlier by Baldwin and Venables (1995, p1614), “The potential growth
effects of RIAs [regional integration agreements] often seem to be uppermost in the minds of
policy makers, yet they have received relatively little attention in the academic literature.” Since
then, researchers have made some progress as reviewed in the next section. Existing papers
typically use dummy variables for RTAs in cross-country studies and mostly find insignificant
growth effects of RTAs. This paper improves upon the existing studies in several ways. First,
2
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considering the tremendous heterogeneity among RTAs (in terms of the number of partners
covered, bloc size, and the degree of liberalization), I use various measures of RTAs that are
more precise than indicator variables. Second, previous papers usually study only small subsets
of the RTAs formed before the 1990s, while the proliferation of RTAs began in the 1990s. This
paper covers a comprehensive set of 270 RTAs reported and not reported to the WTO by 2007.
Finally and importantly, previous papers look at the growth effects of the WTO and RTAs
separately, while my analysis focuses on how the growth effect of RTAs depends on countries’
WTO membership. Despite the intense debate on regionalism versus multilateralism, “This area
of research generally does not consider the effects of preferential trade agreements [on growth]
as opposed to non-discriminatory trade opening,” as noted in the 2011 World Trade Report
(WTO 2011, p104). The objective of this paper is to fill this gap. Although this paper does not
address directly whether RTAs help or hinder multilateralism, it shows that their
complementarity in economic growth is so far limited.
In a theoretical model, the enlargement of a country’s free market size resulting from the
formation of RTAs affects economic growth through reduced prices of imported intermediate
goods. As the main testable hypothesis, the model shows that RTAs are more beneficial to
growth for non-WTO members and their growth effects are reduced for WTO members because
of the smaller preference margins RTAs can offer beyond MFN tariffs. The model also predicts a
postive growth effect of an RTA when the external tariffs applied to countries outside the bloc
remain unchanged but the effect can turn weaker (stronger) when the external tariffs increase
(decrease) after the RTA comes into force. Using a large panel dataset covering 177 countries
over the period of 1960–2007, I find strong empirical support for the main theoretical prediction.
RTAs foster economic growth when a country is not a WTO member, and the effect is not
significantly different from zero for WTO members. This result is robust to various measures of
RTAs and various econometric methods. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the scatter plots of
countries’ annual growth rates in 2007 against the share of preferential exports among a
country’s total exports (Expsh_P) for non-WTO members (left panel) and WTO members (right
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panel) respectively. The left panel shows a positive association between Expsh_P and growth
rates, while the right panel shows a negative relationship between them.4
In addition, I find that the above finding holds well for the full-fledged or “deep” RTAs
signed under GATT Article XXIV, including free trade areas and customs unions, which are
together referred to as free trade agreements (FTAs) in this paper. However, the corresponding
estimated coefficeints are indistinguishably different from zero for the partial-scope or “shallow”
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed under the GATT Enabling Clause.5 This is to be
expected due to their poor implementation and very limited sector coverage. As described in the
same WTO document used for the opening quote, “It is generally accepted that a developmental
rationale exists for allowing developing countries to engage in progressive asymmetric
liberalization with selected partners. However, if transition periods are too long or too many
products are excluded from coverage, potential gains from RTAs in terms of growth and
development will be foregone.”
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a review of the literature. In
Section 3, I lay out a theoretical model and propose the empirically testable hypothesis. In
Section 4, I discuss the empirical strategy and the data. Regression results are reported in Section
5. And I conclude in Section 6.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is an extremely large literature on trade and growth. Theoretical predictions can be
ambiguous depending on model assumptions. A large empirical literature also produces mixed
results, but in general indicates a benign role of trade and openness in economic growth, with the
issue of causality still under debate. A thorough review of the literature is beyond the scope of
this paper. The discussion here is limited to the studies that relate economic growth to trade
agreements, especially RTAs. Relative to studies on trade in general, there are fewer papers on
the growth effects of discriminatory trade liberalization. Besides the static welfare effect related
to trade creation (diversion) and resource reallocation, RTAs can affect a country’s medium-run
growth through the accumulation of productive factors such as investment creation and diversion,
4

Expsh_P is calculated by Carpenter and Lendle (2011), who consider preferential only the trade flows with
applicable tariffs lower than the corresponding MFN or regular tariffs. More details about these estimates can be
found in Section 4.1.
5
RTAs in this paper include both FTAs and PTAs.
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and can also affect a country’s long-run growth through their impacts on technology (Baldwin
and Venables 1995).6 It is difficult to distinguish the static effects from the dynamic effects of
RTAs empirically, and this paper does not intend to do so either. Nevertheless, it is still useful to
think through theoretically how RTAs can affect economic growth.
In the following, I discuss some additional channels through which trade agreements can
affect the economic performance of a country. Some of them have been studied by existing
papers. First, the WTO and many RTAs have gone beyond trade in goods to cover trade in
services, investment, competition, property rights, migration, and even some political
requirements. For example, the liberalization of services sectors under GATS Article V can
increase the economic efficiency of a country by reducing not only trade barriers but also many
domestic institutional barriers. The alignment of policies on investment and property rights are
expected to help long-run growth, although their short-run effects for some countries may be
ambiguous. Second, trade agreements may correct international policy externalities and help
members to avoid trade wars which would reduce efficiency and dampen economic growth (see,
e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1995; and Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Third, trade agreements as a
commitment device can help members avoid the time inconsistency problem typically associated
with unilateral trade liberalization (see, e.g., Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998; Staiger and
Tabellini 1999; and Mitra 2002). Tang and Wei (2009) show that the WTO, as a commitment
device, increases its members’ investment and economic growth significantly since the Uruguay
Round. Related, trade agreements as a commitment device can improve the bargaining position
of a government that is weak relative to domestic special interests groups (see, e.g., Limao and
Tovar 2011), and help countries with weak institutions to lock-in their reforms which may
benefit their long-run economic growth. This is one of the important incentives of many
developing countries that seek RTAs with richer nations (e.g., Mexico and the NAFTA; Central
and Eastern European countries and the EU). Fourth, RTAs that reduce policy uncertainty and
6

Similarly, Walz (1997) summarizes the dynamic effects of integration on growth as follows: the reallocation effect
referring to intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral resource allocation; the redundancy effect referring to the avoidance of
duplicative R&D in different countries in the presence of international technology spillovers; and the scale effect
arising from increasing returns to scale associated with either technology spillovers or specialized suppliers in
monopolistic competition. The three types of dynamic effects, although labeled slightly differently for broad trade
liberalization or restrictions, can be found in earlier papers, such as Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). On the FTAtechnology linkage in particular, Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (1996) study theoretically the growth-creating effects
of trade blocs through their effects on innovation and technological changes.
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macroeconomic instability, and help policy coordination within the bloc can raise long-run
growth rates. Cadot, Olarreaga, and Tschopp (2009) provide evidence that RTAs reduce the
volatility of trade policy. Economic cooperation and policy coordination within RTAs in areas
like public goods provision (i.e., research and training, information sharing, trade facilitation,
large scale infrastructure, joint development of institutional rules, and policy harmonization) is
especially beneficial to economic growth.
In the theoretical literature, it is not a general conclusion that trade and trade agreements
are always growth-friendly. Whether or not trade is good for growth depends on several
parameters such as technology diffusion, the source of technological progress, and a country’s
initial conditions. On RTAs in particular, poorly implemented RTAs waste resources, and highly
distortive ones may harm economic development of some members and outsiders when trade and
investment diversion dominates trade and investment creation. Even in an overall growthpromoting RTA, some smaller members and those on the periphery may be worse off when firms
relocate to the “center” of a bloc. Therefore, the relationship between RTAs and growth is
largely an empirical matter.
Among the existing empirical papers on RTAs, most of them use simply RTA dummy
variables and examine only several major RTAs prior 1990s (see, e.g., Brada and Mendez 1988;
De Melo et al. 1992; Henrekson et al. 1997; Vamvakidis 1999; and Vanhoudt 1999). Berthelon
(2004) improves on the previous studies by covering 70 RTAs signed before 2000, considers the
size of partners in the RTA measure, and studies the asymmetric growth effects of RTAs for
North-North, South-South and North-South agreements. Instead of using a RTA dummy,
Badinger (2005) constructs an integration index as the weighted average tariffs and trade costs to
measure RTAs, but his analysis is only for EU members. Besides the RTA coverage and
measurement issues, these papers provide mixed evidence and do not offer a conclusive view on
RTA growth effects.
3. THEORY
In this section, I present a model that links FTA preferential tariffs and WTO MFN tariffs
to economic growth. In the model, the growth effects of FTAs depend not only on the WTO
membership of FTA partners, but also the effects of FTAs on their external tariffs. The
technology in this model is assumed to have constant returns to scale, so the benefits of freer
6

trade on income and growth are not attained through economies of scale but through the increase
in imported inputs due to lower trade barriers.
This model is built on the theory on growth and the political boundary of countries as in
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina et al. (2000), and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005). In these
papers, they study how endogenous country size is determined by trade liberalization and how
trade and country size affect economic growth. The theory can be modified to analyze the growth
effects of free trade blocs. Instead of studying a country’s own size, here I look at the world
market size of a country covered by its FTAs. To examine the interaction between regional and
multilateral liberalization, I enrich the model by distinguishing the nondiscrimination MFN
tariffs applied to WTO members from the tariffs applied to non-members (outsiders), assuming
zero tariffs within FTAs. Furthermore, I also discuss the implications when external tariffs of
FTA members are endogenously determined.
3.1. Model structure, assumptions, and equilibrium
Consider a world in which there is a continuum of firms on the interval [0, W] and each
firm is located in a different location. Locations (or firms) belong to N different countries with
size S1, S2, … SN-1, and SN respectively, whose total size is W. A firm in location i produces yi(t)
units of a final good Y at time t, according to the following production function.
A

(1)

where 0 < α < 1; xij(t) denotes the amount of intermediate input j used in location i at time t
(produced by either home or foreign countries); and A captures the total factor productivity. Each
location in a country is assumed to be endowed with one unit of labor (L = 1), which is immobile
between locations with inelastic supply. Hence, I can drop L from equation (1) and use

to

measure income per capita in terms of final product, which is the same as the income in dollar
value because the price of the final product is normalized to one. From now on, I may also omit
the time subscript (t) where there is no ambiguity.
At each location i, the firm produces a specific input Xi using the location-specific capital
Ki according to the following linear production function.
(2)

Xi = Ki

7

where Ki denotes the aggregate capital at location i. Because the location-specific capital is
assumed to be immobile between locations with inelastic supply, equation (2) is also a resource
constraint for the supply of intermediate input i.
I assume that intermediate inputs can be traded freely with no barriers (τ = 0) within an
FTA as an enlarged home market;7 while a trade cost of the iceberg type (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) exists
between different countries that are not in the same FTA (foreign market). Let
unit of input i used at each location within an FTA of country

denote the

(home market); and let

denote the unit of input i shipped to a foreign location in a non-FTA trading partner (
1

units of input can actually arrive in

are WTO members and

′ ′′

always apply.

′ ′′

if both

and

if at least one country is not a WTO member (superscript “o”

denotes outsiders). 8 I assume 1
9

, where

), so only

0 and the lowest applicable trade barriers

For simplicity, I assume that

is the same for all WTO members; and

is

the same for all outsiders.
The intermediate goods markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Hence, each
unit of input i will be sold at a price equal to its marginal product in both the home market
(within FTAs) and the foreign market (outside FTAs), when the price of final goods is
normalized to one. The market price of input i,
(3)

, can be written as follows.

1

Based on equation (2), I have the following resource constraint for each input i in
country

:

(4)

,

,

7

I assume zero internal tariffs for all FTAs for simplicity, keeping in mind that most FTAs have staging periods for
tariff reduction. The model can be easily generalized to consider gradual liberalization under FTAs or partial-scope
preferential trade arrangements.
8
I assume that WTO members apply MFN tariffs to the imports from all of the other members but not to nonmembers. Although some WTO members may extend their MFN tariffs to many non-members, the benefits may be
limited and are usually subject to uncertainties and the discretion of MFN tariff granting nations. For example, the
normal trading relationship granted by the U.S. to China was subject to legislative approval in the U.S. on a yearly
basis from 1990 until the late 1990s.
9
Using the tariff data for 1988-2007 from the UN TRAINS database, supplemented by the data from the WTO IDB,
I measure a country’s average external tariff in a year by the import weighted average MFN applied tariff. Then I
calculate the average tariffs for two groups of countries comprising of non-WTO members and WTO members
respectively over 1988-2007, weighted by countries’ real GDP; the former is indeed much larger than the latter
(
15% vs.
6%).
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where

is the stock of capital in location i of country

in which country
FTAs.

is a member and

.

is the market size of the FTAs

is the unit of input i used in each location within the

is the size of countries that have WTO but no FTA relationships with

, and

,

is the unit of input i shipped to each location in these countries. Equation (4) shows that the
resources used to produce input i in country
(Home, including

are allocated among the FTA partners of

itself), other WTO members (but not FTA partners), and non-WTO/FTA
). If a country ( ) has no FTA, then the first term of the

members (i.e.,

right side of (4) will be reduced to its own size (

). If a country ( ) is not a WTO member,

then the second term of the right side of (4) will be zero.
By substituting (3) into (4), I obtain the following two equations.
/

(5)
(6)

"

/

1
1

where

/
/

1

/

. Equations (5) and (6) imply

that barriers to trade (τ) increase the domestic use of an input and reduce international trade.
Then, by substituting (5) into (3), I obtain:
(7)
On the consumption side, an individual at each location i is assumed to have the
following standard continuous time CRRA intertemporal utility function (or isoelastic utility):
(8)
where cit denotes a representative individual i’s consumption at time t , with σ > 0 as the
reciprocal of the constant intertemporal substitution elasticity between any two points in time
and ρ > 0 as a time discount rate. In each location i, consumers’ total net household assets are
identical to the stock of capital

. Since each unit of capital yields one unit of intermediate

input i, the net return to capital is equal to the market price of the intermediate input

.

Depreciation is assumed away for simplicity. After solving an intertemporal optimization
problem, I have the following standard Euler equation for consumption in location i belonging to
country
(9)

:
⁄
9

where

=dcit/dt. As in a standard Ramsey model, the steady-state level of capital at each

location i of a country

is obtained as the solution of
/

∗

(10)

0.10

⁄

By substituting (10) into (5) and (6), and using (1), I have the steady state level of output
per capita in location i of a country
∗

(11)
/

/

and

is monotonically decreasing in trade barrier (τ),

and

where
Because

:

/

/

1

,

the levels of openness of WTO members and outsiders (1
Using

/

1

.

measure respectively
0 .

, I can rewrite (11) as
∗

(12)

1

I have so far assumed implicitly that country

is a WTO member. If country

is not a

WTO member, then we can rewrite (12) as
∗
,

(13)

1

∉

Before performing a comparative statics analysis on how the changes in

,

and

affect economic growth, we need the following assumptions on the relationship between
and

.
0

(14)
(15)

∈

1, 0

Equation (14) implies that a country’s entry into the WTO does not affect the size of its
existing FTAs because MFN tariffs are assumed to be higher than (at most equal to) the zero
FTA internal tariffs. Equation (15) implies that a new FTA will normally reduce the share of
trade under the WTO MFN tariffs because the zero FTA tariffs will replace any corresponding
positive MFN tariffs upon the formation of an FTA. If all of the FTA partners were originally
1. If all of the FTA partners were originally outside the

WTO members, then
WTO, then

10

0.

See, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 2) for a detailed derivation.
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3.2 Comparative statics analysis with exogenous external tariffs of FTAs
For now, I assume that signing an FTA removes the internal trade barriers, but does not
affect a country’s external tariffs on imports from non-FTA partners. Equations (11)-(15)
provide the following comparative statics results:
(16)

∗

⁄

(17)

∗

⁄

(18)

∗

⁄

∗

0
0
0
1

(19)
∗

∉

(20)

∈
1

1

,

1

∗

∉

Equations (16) and (17) show that the growth effect of
(

: the larger a country’s world market to which
(

(

(

) increases with

) apply, the bigger the effect of

) on growth. Equation (18) suggests that the effect of WTO coverage (

growth depends on

) on

, the degree to which WTO members liberalize trade vis-à-vis

outsiders (or the “preference” margin of MFN tariffs over the tariffs applied to imports from
outsiders).
Equations (19) and (20), showing the growth effects of FTAs for WTO members and
non-WTO members respectively, are the main results of interest. Equation (19) suggests that the
growth effects of FTAs for a WTO member also rely on the WTO membership of its FTA
0), then the

partners. If no partner country in a new FTA belongs to the WTO (
effects of the FTA on growth for a WTO member will be the largest at
1

∗

⁄

∉

, which is the same as if this country is outside the WTO as shown by equation (20).
1),

For a WTO member, if all of its FTA partners also belong to the WTO (
then the effects of the FTA on growth will be the smallest at
1

∗

⁄

∈

. The differential growth effect between the FTAs that are completely outside the

WTO and those that are completely nested inside the WTO can be written as follows:
(21)

11

The above equation also measures the reduced growth effect of FTAs after a country
joins the WTO, or the growth effect of the WTO as shown in equation (18). It is a function of the
preference margin of the WTO (i.e.,

). In sum, the model predicts that the WTO and

RTAs are substitutable for each other. In the empirical analysis, I adopt two strategies to
examine empirically the complementarity between FTAs and the WTO. First, I include in the
regressions an interaction term between FTA and WTO measures. Second, I also construct a
measure of FTAs between WTO members and another measure of the FTAs not between WTO
members, which should have stronger growth effect than the former measure. See Section 4 for a
more detailed discussion on the empirical strategies.
In addition, equation (19) also shows that, if the “preference” margin offered by the WTO
is small (i.e.,

→

), then a country’s WTO status will not make a big difference. When

, equation (19) for a WTO member is reduced to equation (20) for a non-WTO
member. In another special case when there are no trade barriers at all (i.e.,

1),

FTAs and WTO would be irrelevant to growth.
The following proposition summarizes the main predictions of the above comparative
statics analysis:
PROPOSITION The steady state level of output per capita in each location i of a country
increasing in the country’s level of trade openness (
its FTAs and the WTO (

and

and

is

), and the market coverage of

). The growth effects of FTAs are stronger for non-WTO

members as compared to WTO members.
The above prediction is related to the extent-of-the-market theory, which shows that an
increase in openness reduces the importance of domestic income in generating later growth.
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Ades and Glaeser (1999), Alesina et al. (2000), and Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2005) argue that access to larger markets helps economic growth especially for small
countries; and Alcalá and Ciccone (2003) provide some empirical evidence. Instead of studying
the growth effects of a country’s domestic economic size and its interaction with openness, in
this paper, I look at the growth effects of FTA size and its interaction with WTO membership.

12

3.3 Comparative statics analysis with endogenous external tariffs of FTAs
FTAs are so far assumed not to affect external tariffs on the imports from non-FTA
members. A large literature on endogenous external tariffs suggests that the external tariffs may
increase or decrease. Please refer to Freund and Ornelas (2010) among others for reviews of the
related papers. I do not intend to incorporate endogenous external tariffs into the model. Relying
on theoretical predictions in the existing literature, I only discuss how the endogeneity of
external tariffs may affect FTA growth effects, and allow for both positive and negative effects
of FTAs on external tariffs, not restricted to a specific mechanism. With endogenous external
and

tariffs of FTAs,

will be affected by FTAs. For simplicity, I assume that the effects

and

of FTAs on

⁄

are the same (i.e.,

).

Based on equations (12) and (13), I have:
∗

1

(22)
∗

∉

(23)

1

∉

∉

Compared to equations (19) and (20), the above two formulas have an additional term
related to the effects of FTAs on external tariffs or openness ( ). Whether the effects in (22) and
(23) are bigger or smaller than those in equations (19) and (20) depends on the sign of
⁄

⁄

or

∉

. If

⁄

0 and

⁄

∉

> 0, then FTAs reduce

external tariffs and this would reinforce the growth effects of FTAs. Conversely, if
0 and

⁄

∉

⁄

< 0, then FTAs increase external tariffs and this would reduce the growth

effects of FTAs on growth. When the increase in external tariffs is sufficiently large, FTAs
overall may reduce growth.
A couple of notes are in order here before the empirical analysis. First, although the
theoretical results are driven by market access to inputs, there are many channels through which
trade and trade agreements may affect growth (e.g., technology, investment, scale economies,
and increased varieties and competition). Empirically, it is difficult to disentangle these effects
from each other. I estimate the overall effects of FTAs on growth and consider it a complement
rather than a substitute for more detailed work that examines the specific mechanisms by which
FTAs affect growth. Therefore, we should allow for a more general economic interpretation of
13

the results reported later. Second, higher income levels achieved by countries participating in the
WTO or FTAs through reduced trader barriers on inputs is a “level” effect, so what the empirical
analysis intends to capture is the economic growth when countries transit from a lower income
level to a higher income level after joining the WTO or signing FTAs, or the effects of the WTO
and FTAs on the steady-state output. Although this is not a genuine permanent effect on a
country’s steady state growth rate, this is not really a problem. As Temple (2003) warns, we
should not undervalue level effects and it is quite plausible that past and future developments rest
entirely on level effects, some large, some small (Obvious Rule #5).11
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
I test the theoretical predictions using canonical cross-country growth regressions, which
can be derived from the Solow growth model (Solow 1956). In a panel data setting, this growth
regression should contain some dynamics in lagged output and other controls as follows (see,
e.g., Islam 1995).
(24)

ln y i ,t   1 RTAi ,t 1   2 RTAi ,t 1 * WTOi ,t 1   3 ln y i ,t 1  X i,t γ  Z i,t   i   t  ei ,t

where the first two covariates on the right hand side, the RTA variable and its interaction term
with the WTO variable, are the key variables of interest; yi ,t and yi ,t 1 are the current and lagged
income per capita; X i ,t is a vector containing other classic Solow growth variables including the
saving rate (or investment/GDP ratio), population growth rate, etc.; Z i ,t contains other traderelated variables including the WTO variable, a GSP measure, etc.;  i and  t are country and
year fixed effects; and ei ,t is an error term. I could also use annual growth rate as the dependent
variable, but this is statistically equivalent to specification (24) because the lagged income
variable is also included on the right hand side, although the parameter on lagged income has a
slightly different interpretation.
4.1 Measures of trade agreements and empirical strategy
11

Temple (2003): “In the Solow model, growth can only be maintained by a sequence of level effects, as a constant
stream of technical innovations feeds through into higher output. It should not worry us that long-run growth in
research-driven models is similarly hard to sustain, or unresponsive to policy. These models will continue to yield
level effects that should be central to policy analysis.”
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The WTO variable used in this paper is a WTO membership dummy.12 The preferred
WTO membership measure is called de facto membership, which include not only formal WTO
members but also non-member participants (NMPs). NMPs include colonies of GATT members,
newly-sovereign nations, and provisional applicants to the GATT. The data on NMPs are from
Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007),13 who show that NMPs are at least as liberalized as formal
members in terms of trade promotion. If I classify NMPs as non-members, this will cause a
measurement error in WTO membership. Although most of the major trading nations by now
have joined the WTO, there are quite a few non-WTO members in earlier years. The share of
non-WTO members ranges from 38% in 1960 to 21% in 2007 based on the de facto membership.
Measuring RTAs is not straightforward. Most of the previous studies use an RTA dummy
indicating if a country is covered by any RTA, ignoring the tremendous heterogeneity in the
degree of a country’s involvement in RTAs in terms of the size of the trading blocs and the
extent of the integration. For instance, Eicher and Henn (2011) show that the trade creation effect
is very uneven across different FTAs. In this paper, I use more precise RTA measures. Following
Liu and Ornelas (2014), the baseline measure is FTAtradesh, defined as the share of a country’s
trade with FTA partners among its total trade in a given year. It considers not only the number of
RTA partners a country has but also the importance of each partner as measured by trade volume.
In this paper, FTAs cover both free trade areas and customs unions signed according to GATT
Article XXIV, which I refer to as full-fledged or deep RTAs. I also use an analogous definition
PTAtradesh for partial-scope preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed according to GATT
Enabling Clause (shallow RTAs).14 Although most agreements are in the FTA category, the trade
share of PTAs is nontrivial. The average trade share for PTAs in the sample is 0.05 as compared
to 0.12 for FTAs. To construct the trade shares, I carefully consider the dates of the formation of
new blocs, of the accession of new members, and of the de-activation of existing blocs. Although
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Although it cannot measure precisely the likely differential effects of the WTO across countries, it has its own
advantage compared to other measures such as MFN tariffs. MFN tariff data are unavailable for non-WTO members,
and are missing even for many members before the 1990s. In addition, a WTO membership dummy can capture the
effects on growth through not only trade but also non-trade channels. Hence, I use WTO membership as the
preferred WTO measure in this paper.
13
I update the original NMP data (up to 2001) to 2007, assuming that countries had retained their NMP statuses by
2007 unless they joined the WTO after 2001.
14
There are exceptions; for example, MERCOSUR was signed under the Enabling Clause, but is classified as a free
trade area (customs union after 1995).
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these measures are not perfect, they can capture more precisely the relative importance of RTA
partners than binary RTA variables.
The model predicts that the growth effects of FTAs are stronger for non-WTO members
than for WTO members. As indicated in Section 3.2, this can be tested by including in the
regressions an interaction term between the WTO membership dummy and FTAtradesh. Another
approach is based on equations (19) and (20), which suggest that the growth effects of FTAs
depend not only on a country’s own WTO membership, but also on the WTO membership of its
FTA partners. If a country is not a WTO member or none of its FTA partners belongs to the
WTO, then the growth effects of this FTA will be the largest. Conversely, if all of the FTA
partners are also WTO members, the growth effects of this FTA will be the smallest because of
the small preference margins this FTA can offer. The second approach suggests the following
two variables, the sum of which equals FTAtradesh as defined above.
 FTAtradesh_WTO: a WTO member’s FTA trade share with other WTO members in a year,
which is zero for a non-WTO member;
 FTAtradesh_nWTO: a country’s FTA trade share not between the WTO members in a year
(i.e., either this country or its FTA partners are outside the WTO).
Although FTAtradesh measures are more precise than the RTA dummy variables as used
in other papers, they may overstate the true share of trade conducted on a preferential basis for
the following reasons. First, not all of the products traded between FTA partners enjoy
preferential treatments because of product exclusions and long staging periods of tariff
reduction.15 Second, RTA partners’ MFN tariff rates on some products may have already been
reduced to zero or very low levels so there is not much preference to give. Third, preferential
rates under FTAs may not always be utilized because of either small preference margins or high
costs related to paper works and rules of origin. For these reasons, I also use two more precise
measures of preference margins calculated by Carpenter and Lendle (2011) who consider as
preferential only those trade flows for which the applicable tariff is lower than the corresponding
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Product exclusion is less serious for full-fledged FTAs because GATT Article XXIV requires them to cover
“substantially all the trade.” Damuri (2009) shows that approximately 7% of tariff lines in the 15 RTAs between
four major economies (U.S., EU, Japan, and Canada) are classified as “products excluded” either temporally or
permanently, mostly in agriculture and food sectors.
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MFN or regular tariff rates.16 They first calculated the share of exports that enjoy preferential
tariffs (EXPsh_P) for each exporter. Then they computed the preference margin (PM) as the
duties saved from preference (relative to the corresponding MFN or regular tariff rates) divided
by a country’s total exports.17 In the empirical analysis, I also use EXPsh_P or PM to replace
FTAtradesh.
Finally, I also include in the analysis a variable for the General System of Preferences
(GSPexpsh), which is defined as the share of a country’s exports to GSP granting countries
among its total exports in a given year. I consider only exports because GSP does not affect
directly the imports of GSP receiving countries. Because GSP usually has very limited product
coverage, this measure, considering all of the exports to GSP granting countries, is a very rough
one. Compared to FTAs and the WTO, GSP is special in that it is non-reciprocal.
4.2 Choosing other growth determinants
The growth literature is flooded with a plethora of growth determinants. One challenge in
empirical growth research is to identify the relevant regressors. Several approaches have been
proposed to select growth variables (see, e.g., Levine and Renelt 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997).
More recently, model averaging techniques have become popular in variable selection as in
Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001). Most studies suggest that initial
or lagged income and the share of investment in GDP should be included, but they differ widely
on other variables. Since there is no consensus on variable selection, my analysis follows the
classic Solow model, augmented with trade related variables as the key variables of interest and
many other variables for robustness checks.
The relationship between trade and growth has been studied extensively in the literature.
Researchers use different measures of trade policy or trade outcome variables. These variables
include but are not limited to trade openness (i.e., (export+import)/GDP), tariff, import
penetration, years of open regime, and outward orientation or liberalization. Instead of using
16

Their estimates are based on all of the tariff-line level import and tariff data of the top 20 importers including
EU27 and the other 19 largest importers, covering almost 90% of the world imports in 2008. All of the exporting
nations to the top 20 importers are covered. The trade coverage by exporters (as measured by their exports to the
top-20 importers divided by their total exports to all of the countries) is also approximately 90%. I use the
preference margin estimates for exporters because these estimates cover most of the countries in the world (223
exporters in total).
17
For exporters outside the WTO such as Russia, their “MFN” tariffs are regular tariffs vis-à-vis preferential tariffs.
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these trade volume or trade policy variables, I include various trade agreement measures. I also
include the ratio of “nonproductive” government consumption over GDP (net of public spending
on education and defense) as an explanatory variable. This ratio is used to capture the effects of
the size of government on growth, which is highly relevant to the current debate regarding the
role of government versus market in the economy. This ratio, widely used by researchers, is
usually found to be negatively correlated with growth (see Barro 1991, among others).
4.3 Data and sources
The final dataset used in the regression analysis is large panel covering 177 countries
over the period of 1960–2007. The RTA measures are constructed from a bilateral database
which covers more than 200 countries. Table 1 has the definitions and descriptive statistics of
most of the variables used in the growth regression analysis. Appendix 1 lists the countries
covered by the growth regressions with the de facto GATT/WTO entry years in parentheses, and
Appendix 2 lists the 270 RTAs used in this paper and seven different data sources.18 The import
and export data used to construct the RTA trade share measures are from the IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics. Data on GDP per capita, investment/GDP ratio, and government
consumption/GDP ratio are from the Penn World Table. Legal origin data are drawn from La
Porta et al. (1999).
Finally, the GSP data are mainly from the UNCTAD publication: Operation and Effects
of the Generalized System of Preferences. I use all of the published reviews 1-10, which offer
GSP data for years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979, and 1984. In addition, I updated the data to
2008 using another source from the UNCTAD: Generalized System of Preferences List of
Beneficiaries [2001, 2005, 2006, and 2008].19 All of the gaps are filled by extending the GSP
data backward or forward.20 Some checks and changes are made to the original data according to
specific government publications on GSP. The graduations or suspensions of some beneficiaries
are also considered.
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Service agreements and accession agreements to existing agreements (e.g., EC) are not counted separately.
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.62 (2001) and UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.62/Rev. 1-3 (2005, 2006, 2008).
20
I extend 1973 GSP back to the original extension date of GSP; use the GSP data in 1975 and 1977 for 1976 and
1978 respectively; extend 1979 and 1984 forward and backward respectively for two years to fill 1980-1983; extend
1984 and 2001 forward and backward respectively for eight years to fill 1985-2000; extend 2001 data forward to
2003; extend 2005 data backward to 2004; and extend 2008 data backward to 2007.
19
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5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The dependent variable in the growth regression is the logarithm of real GDP per capita
(i.e., log(rGDP/POP)). To alleviate the potential endogeneity problem, I lag all of the traderelated variables by one year so that they are predetermined in the growth regressions. To control
for the unobserved heterogeneity across countries, I allow for country fixed effects in the
regressions. I also report the plain OLS regression results, with many additional time-invariant
covariates including region dummies,21 legal origin dummies, the dummy for the least developed
countries (LDCs),22 and the dummy for the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). These additional covariates are not reported on the result tables to save space.
5.1 Baseline regression results
I show first the results from a specification without the interaction term between RTAs
and the WTO. The first two columns of Table 2 report the OLS and country fixed effects
regression results, using FTAtradesh (deep RTAs only) and de facto WTO membership as the
preferred measures. The standard errors for the coefficients are based on White's
heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimates. FTAtradesh is insignificant in both regressions.
Probably owing to the substantial heterogeneity among FTAs, it is difficult to find a significant
growth effect for all FTAs together. These results, together with the mixed findings in the
existing studies as reviewed in section 2, point out the importance of studying the asymmetric
effects of trade agreements on growth. In this paper, I investigate in particular the differential
effects of RTAs on growth based on countries’ WTO membership.
Next, we take into account the WTO membership of RTA participants. Before showing
the regression results, I first calculate the simple unconditional average growth rates for different
sets of countries grouped based on their WTO and FTA memberships. For non-WTO members,
countries with FTAs have an average growth rate nearly 50% higher than those without FTAs
during 1960–2007 (2.75% versus 1.88%); while for WTO members, countries with FTAs have
an average growth rate only 10% higher than those without FTAs during the same period of time

21
22

Africa, Asia, Central America & Caribbean, Europe, Middle East, North America, Oceania, and South America.
LDCs are defined by the United Nations: http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/
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(2.22% versus 2%).23 This pattern is consistent with the theoretical prediction and will be further
confirmed by the following regression analysis.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 report the OLS and country fixed effects regression
results from the regressions with the FTAtradesh*WTO interaction term. The coefficient of
FTAtradesh, measuring the growth effect of FTAs for non-WTO members, is positive and
significant at the 5% level. The fixed effects regression results imply that an increase in
FTAtradesh by one standard deviation (0.224) can on average lead to approximately 1% increase
in growth rate (i.e.,

.

∗ .

1

1% ) for non-WTO members. 24 The coefficient of

FTAtradesh*WTO interaction term bears a negative sign and is significant at the 1% or 5% level.
The sum of the first two coefficients, measuring the growth effects of FTAs for WTO members,
is not significantly different from zero as shown by the reported p-values at the bottom of the
table. These results tell that FTAs have positive and significant effects on growth only if a
country is not a WTO member.
In columns (5) and (6), I include not only FTAtradesh for deep RTAs but also
PTAtradesh for shallow RTAs, as well as their interaction terms with the WTO variable. The
coefficients for the first two variables are similar to those reported in the previous two columns;
while PTAtradesh and its interaction term are highly insignificant. This is to be expected because
PTAs have limited sector coverage and are usually poorly implemented.25
The extent-of-the-market theory discussed in section 3.2 predicts that an increase in
openness should reduce the importance of domestic market size in economic growth. In the last
two regressions of Table 2, I add a country size measure and its interaction term with the WTO
variable and remove the highly insignificant PTAtradesh related variables. I use the world share
of a country’s real GDP as a measure for its market size (rGDPsh). 26 If the WTO helps to
liberalize trade, then its effects on growth should be bigger for smaller countries. The sign
23

These numbers are based on the sample used in the regressions in Table 2.
We should be cautious in interpreting the significant growth effect of FTAs for non-WTO members. If trade and
investment diverting FTAs lower the growth rates of outside countries, then the positive growth effect of these FTAs
can be partially driven by their negative growth effect on outsiders. Although the literature is not conclusive on trade
diversion, it does not seem to be a major concern as summarized by Freund and Ornelas (2010).
25
I have also tried adding WTO*GSP and RTA*GSP interactions. Because they are always highly insignificant, I
choose not to include them in the regressions.
26
Previous papers testing the extent-of-market hypothesis usually use initial GDP or population size (POP) to
measure market size in cross-sectional growth regressions. In the panel data regressions with country fixed effects, it
is not feasible to use initial GDP or POP.
24
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pattern of the first two coefficients reported in columns (7) and (8) supports this view, but these
coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficients of FTAtradesh and
FTAtradesh*WTO stay largely unchanged.
The results are consistent with the finding by Carpenter and Lendle (2011) that the
preference margins offered by RTAs relative to MFN tariff rates are small. The share of MFN
duty free imports is 52% in 2008 (excluding EU intra-trade) and over 70% is the trade at an
MFN rate below 5%; and only 16% of imports are preferential. WTO (2011) shows that the
average applied tariff rate was between 20% and 30% in 1947 and dropped to only 4% across all
products and countries in 2009. These facts imply that the benefits of signing RTAs to a WTO
member are limited during more recent years.
The insignificant growth effect of FTAs for WTO members may seem to be at odds with
the trade-promoting effect of FTAs. Many papers find that countries tend to trade more with
their FTA partners than with non-partners, even for WTO members. We should be cautious in
interpreting this finding as the evidence for trade creation of FTAs because it can be simply due
to that fact that natural trading partners are more likely to form FTAs. Hence, it is crucial to
consider the endogeneity of FTAs when estimating their trade effect. In addition, we should
consider both trade creation and trade diversion when evaluating the welfare effects of FTAs.
Based on a simultaneous equation estimation of FTAs and bilateral trade flows, Magee (2003)
finds that trade creation dominates trade diversion but the welfare gain from FTAs is small; and
the trade effect of FTAs is sensitive to sample coverage and econometric methods. Baier and
Bergstrand (2007, 2009), considering several estimation issues including the endogeneity of
RTAs, find a positive and economically large effect of RTAs on trade. Since trade diversion is
not considered in their papers, they do not intend to provide welfare implications of FTAs. The
empirical literature is not entirely conclusive on the welfare implications of FTAs (see, e.g.,
Freund and Ornelas, 2010). Even if trade creation dominates trade diversion, faster economic
growth is not guaranteed for FTA participants because the trade-growth linkage is still debatable
and FTAs may affect growth through many other channels besides trade. Therefore, the
insignificant growth effect of FTAs for WTO members is not inconsistent with the existing
findings on the trade effect of FTAs.
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In Table 2, other growth determinants have the expected signs: growth is negatively
correlated with lagged income as predicted by the income convergence hypothesis. Higher
investment/GDP

ratio

promotes

growth,

while

population

growth

and

government

consumption/GDP ratio are inversely related to growth. Table 2 also shows that the WTO
variable is positive and significant at the 10% level only in some OLS regressions, while the
coefficient of the GSP variable is always insignificant at the 10% level.
The weak growth effect of the WTO can be attributed to several factors. First, countries
may extend their MFN tariffs to many non-WTO members. For example, an agreements signed
at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Meetings allows tariff-free access to WTO member markets
for 97% of imported products from the world’s 50 least-developed countries by 2008. Second, it
is possible that countries had already made a number of concessions and implemented reforms
before joining the WTO to meet the accession requirements. Therefore, an analysis using
countries’ formal accession dates tends to underestimate the growth effects of the WTO. Third,
the likely heterogeneous growth effects of the WTO for different countries may lead to an
insignificant overall growth effect. Tang and Wei (2009) find the WTO helps growth only for
countries subject to stringent accession requirements since the Uruguay Round. This is also in
line with the findings on the trade effects of the WTO in the literature. Rose (2004) finds that
WTO members do not trade significantly more than non-members; while Subramanian and Wei
(2007) show that the WTO promotes trade only for industrial countries in less protected sectors.
Eicher and Henn (2011), using a unified framework, confirm again an overall statistically
insignificant trade effect of the WTO. This WTO trade effect “puzzle” was also investigated by
other papers. For example, Liu (2009) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2010) show that the WTO
helps to generate new trading relationships at the extensive margin, but does not increase the
trade among existing trading partners at the intensive margin.27
Finally, because of the issues with estimating precisely the growth effect of the WTO as
discussed above, this paper focuses on the partial effect of RTAs on growth, rather than the
growth effect of the WTO. The negative coefficient of the interaction term in Table 2 also
implies that the partial effect of the WTO on growth is smaller for countries that participate
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For the recent WTO episode (1995–2008), however, Felbermayr and Kohler (2010) find evidence for a tradecreating role of membership at the intensive margin.
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actively in regional integration.28 No matter if the WTO reduces the preference margins of FTAs
or FTAs diminish the trade promoting effect of the WTO, both suggest limited complementarity
between the two approaches of trade liberalization.

5.2 Alternative measures of key variables and other robustness checks
The previous regressions use the interaction term between FTA and WTO variables to
test the main theoretical prediction. I also consider an alternative way to capture their interaction
as discussed in Section 4.1. FTAtradesh_WTO and FTAtradesh_nWTO are the FTA trade shares
between and not between WTO members respectively. Equations (19) and (20) imply
FTAtradesh_nWTO should have stronger growth effects than FTAtradesh_WTO. Panel I in Table
3 reports the results from regressions using these alternative measures, with and without country
fixed effects. FTAtradesh_nWTO has a positive and significant growth effect at the 5% level;
while FTAtradesh_WTO is always highly insignificant with a much smaller magnitude. This
supports the theoretical prediction and is consistent with the previous results.
Second, I also use the more precise measures of preferential export share (EXPsh_P) or
preference margins (PM) calculated by Carpenter and Lendle (2011) for 2008 as explained in
Section 4.1. Panel II in Table 3 provides the regression results by replacing FTAtradesh with
EXPsh_P or PM. Because these measures are available only for one year, I run cross-sectional
regressions for year 2007, which is the latest year in the sample. Consistent with the previous
findings, the results show again that preferential exports and preference margins are more growth
promoting for non-WTO members. The coefficients of the interaction term with the WTO
variable are significant at the 1% or 5% level. The growth effects of EXPsh_P and PM are
actually negative for WTO members, as shown by the sum of the two coefficients.29 This is
consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 1.
Third, I provide more robustness checks by dropping countries that are unlikely to lie on
a regression surface common to the majority of nations, such as microstates, least developed
countries, and countries in OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). The results
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This is consistent with the finding by Eicher and Henn (2011) that the WTO boosts trade only prior to FTA
formation, not afterward.
29
The null hypothesis that the first two coefficients in regressions (3) and (4) sum to zero is rejected at the 5%
significance level, as shown by the p-values of the F-test reported at the bottom of the table.
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are reported in Panel III of Table 3. Regression (5) drops microstates, which are defined as
countries with an average real GDP over 1960–2007 less than 10 million USD in constant 2005
price. This removes approximately one third of the countries from the sample. Regression (6)
drops the least developed countries according to the UNCTAD definition30, and regression (7)
drops OPEC countries. In all of these cases, the sign pattern of the FTA and its interaction terms
remains the same as before and their coefficients are significant at the 5% or 10% level.
Finally, the current specification considers only the differential growth effect of FTAs
based on countries’ WTO membership, but assumes that the other explanatory variables
influence economic growth in the same way regardless of countries’ WTO membership. Other
variables may also have differential effects when countries are in the WTO as opposed to when
they are not. In addition, unobserved characteristics of a country may also change after a country
enters the WTO; presumably, this captures the changes in economic policies that occur in order
for a country to enter into the WTO as well as the changes in the error term. To allow for a more
flexible specification, I split the full sample into two sub-samples according to countries’ de
facto WTO membership. Using the same specification as in regression (4) of Table 2 with
country and year fixed effects, I find that FTAtradesh has a positive and significant coefficient
at the 10% level only in the subsample for non-WTO members (β = 0.041); for the WTO
member subsample, however, the coefficient is much smaller (β = 0.009) and insignificant at the
10% level. This is again consistent with the previous finding.31 The results are not shown in the
paper to save space.
5.3 Endogeneity of trade agreements
Endogeneity of trade is a long lasting problem in the trade-growth literature. In this paper,
the same problem may exist for trade agreements. I address this issue with both economic and
econometric arguments. The results show that FTAtradesh is insignificant by itself in growth
regressions (columns (1) and (2), Table 2) but significant after its interaction with the WTO
variable is included. This result can be driven by endogeneity of FTAs only if fast growing non-
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http://unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-Developed-Countries.aspx
Investment/GDP ratio and government spending have different growth effects in the two subsamples, while other
covariates do not appear to have significantly different growth effects for WTO members and non-members. We do
not intend to explain the differential effects of these variables in this paper.
31
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WTO members are more likely to sign FTAs but fast growing WTO members are no more likely
to sign FTAs. But this does not sound plausible because the WTO has so far been little more than
an “innocent bystander” to regionalism. Therefore, endogeneity cannot explain why FTAs
significantly promote growth only if a country is outside the WTO. Even if causation goes the
other way, that is, faster growing countries are more likely to join the WTO and FTAs, this is not
necessarily an issue. It could be the case that joining an agreement provides an incentive for
countries to adopt better economic policies. For example, the accession to the EU requires a
country to meet strict convergence criteria, and accession to the WTO also requires a country to
meet certain conditions, especially after the Uruguay Round. An application to join the WTO
may be simply a demonstration of a government’s resolve to change to a more open trade regime
(Tang and Wei 2009). Hence, we are just as pleased if this is the case.
Nevertheless, I address the endogeneity problem with formal econometric arguments. To
alleviate the endogeneity problem, I have lagged the FTA, WTO and their interaction variables
so that they are predetermined in the growth regression. I have also tried including one-year
and/or two-year lead variables of the FTA, WTO and their interaction variables to see if changes
in FTA and WTO variables are correlated to the income levels in earlier years. None of the lead
variables is significant (separately or jointly), suggesting no obvious reverse causality from
growth to FTA and WTO membership. The results are not reported but available upon request.
In the following, I further address endogeneity using standard two-stage least square (2SLS) and
the generalized method of moments (GMM) method for dynamic panel data analysis.
2SLS is a standard method to address endogeneity problems, but its application is limited
by the availability of valid instruments. For this reason, I only consider the endogeneity of FTA
related variables but take the WTO membership variable as exogenous, given that WTO
accessions are based on multilateral negotiations.32 Because convergence is not the focus of this
paper, I also put aside for now the endogeneity issue of the lagged income variable in 2SLS
regressions. The endogeneity of lagged income and WTO variables will be considered later in
the GMM regressions. Valid instruments for FTAs should be correlated with FTAtradesh but not
with economic growth. Time-invariant geographic variables, which have been used as
instruments for trade in cross-country growth regressions as in Frankel and Romer (1999), are
32

Tang and Wei (2009), using a Heckman procedure, do not find evidence of endogeneity of WTO accessions in a
growth regression.
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inappropriate choices in panel data growth regressions with country fixed effects. Following Liu
and Ornelas (2014), I construct the instrument based on the contagion effect of FTA formation.
Baldwin (1993) formalizes a domino theory of FTAs in which signing or deepening of an FTA
can induce excluded nations to form new FTAs to avoid potential trade diversion. Egger and
Larch (2008) and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010), using spatial econometric methods in a
bilateral data setting, find strong evidence for the contagion effect. I also use bilateral data to
construct the instrument, but the final contagion measure is at country level to fit into the
country*year panel data analysis. I first calculated for each year t the FTAtradeshijt for all of the
trading partners (j) of a country (i) after excluding country i’s own FTA trade with j to ensure the
exogeneity of the instrument.33 Contagionit of country i in year t is calculated as the average
FTAtradeshijt weighted by 1/log(distanceij), where distanceij is the great circle distance between i
and j. I use Contagion and Contagion*WTO as the instruments for FTAtradesh and
FTAtradesh*WTO (all lagged by one year).
The left panel of Table 4 has the results from a 2SLS regression with country fixed
effects and year dummies. The first stage regression results show that Contagion and
Contagion*WTO are very strong instruments, both of which are highly significant with very high
F-statistics. The second stage regression results provide even stronger support for the main
hypothesis. The coefficients of the first two variables are much larger in absolute values as
compared to those from regression (4) in Table 2. The sum of the two coefficients is still
insignificantly different from zero (p-value = 0.17).
The panel data growth regressions include the lagged dependent variable as a covariate
and contain unobserved panel-level effects. In a dynamic panel data setting, the within-groups
transformation leads the transformed lagged dependent variable to be correlated with the
transformed error, and hence lead to inconsistency in within estimators. Arellano and Bond
(1991) derived a consistent GMM estimator for this model, using lagged level variables as
instruments for their first differences. This method has been used to estimate panel data growth
regressions as in Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996). When explanatory variables are highly
persistent (e.g., lagged income), lagged levels can be weak instruments for first differences, and
the GMM estimator can be severely biased especially in short panels. To improve the precision
33

Because the first stage regressions are exactly identified, I cannot use an over-identification test to verify the
exogeneity of the instrument.
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and finite sample properties of the estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a system GMM
estimator that uses additional moment conditions in which lagged differences are used as
instruments for the level equation in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as
instruments for the differenced equation. Bond et al. (2001) show that the system GMM
estimator provides more reliable estimates when estimating growth regressions.34 Hence, I adopt
this system estimator in this paper. This method can not only help to correct the bias in the
coefficient of the lagged income variable, but also allow for other endogenous explanatory
variables. So it can be used to address the potential endogeneity of trade agreement variables. I
consider the potential heterogeneity in the error term by providing the asymptotically
heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimates.35 I will also provide the test for serial correlation
and the Sargan test for over-identification.
The right panel of Table 4 contains the system GMM estimation results. Regression (4)
provides the baseline results, using all possible valid lags of lagged income as the GMM type
instruments, with all other covariates taken as exogenous. The FTA and FTA*WTO variables
bear the same signs as before and are statistically significant, with the magnitude of the
coefficients more than doubled in absolute term as compared to that in Table 2. This lends even
stronger support to the theoretical prediction. Regression (5) considers both FTA and WTO
related variables as endogenous and uses their first two valid lags as GMM type instruments in
addition to all valid lags of the lagged income variable. Using further lags of FTA and WTO
related variables as instruments offers very similar results. Regression (6) is similar to regression
(5) but only takes FTA related variables as endogenous and considers the WTO membership
variable as exogenous. Regression (7) is the same as regression (6) except that it uses Contagion
and Contagion*WTO as additional standard instruments. The results change little.
The Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation (AC) in first-differenced errors shows
that there is a first order serial correlation but no second order serial correlation for all of the
GMM regressions in Table 4. This supports the choice of using lagged values as instruments for
34

It is worth acknowledging that the system GMM estimation can also involve weak instruments under certain
conditions as shown by Bun and Windmeijer (2010).
35
The system GMM can be estimated by a one-step or two-step procedure. When the errors are heteroskedastic,
simulations suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimators can do poorly in hypothesis
testing with typical sample sizes. In these cases, inference based on asymptotic standard errors for the one-step
estimators appears to be more reliable (see Arellano and Bond 1991; and Blundell and Bond 1998). Therefore, I
adopt the one-step estimation.
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the first differences. The Sargan test for over-identification does not reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments are valid.36 Finally, it is useful to note that the coefficient of the lagged
income variable from GMM regressions is very stable ranging from 0.986 to 0.989 in Table 4,
somewhere between the OLS and within estimates reported in Table 2 (approximately 0.99 and
0.96 respectively). As noted by Bond (2002), the true estimate indeed should lie in or near the
range between the OLS estimate (upward biased) and within estimate (downward biased).37 This
fact enhances the reliability of the GMM results, despite the strong assumptions underlying the
method. In sum, the GMM results provide even stronger support for the theoretical prediction.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Development and economic growth lay at the heart of the current WTO Doha Round
negotiations. The rising regionalism has sparked concerns about its development effects, as
shown by the opening quote from the WTO. This paper studies the growth effects of RTAs,
taking into account the WTO participation of RTA members. I show that RTAs and the WTO do
not appear to complement each other in economic growth. Although we do not have to give up
one or the other, this does raise some concerns about the motley spaghetti bowls within a
multilateral system. Because the multilateral approach of trade liberalization under the WTO is
the first best, countries should make some efforts to multilateralize regionalism, as recommended
by Baldwin (2006) and the WTO (2011). Non-WTO members may use RTAs as an effective
alternative to liberalize trade and prepare for future WTO accessions and multilateral
liberalization, provided that these agreements do not lock out competition. For WTO members,
we need to understand what the RTAs can possibly accomplish beyond the WTO. In areas where
RTAs have the unique capacity to achieve faster and deeper liberalization at no further expense
of multilateral rules, RTAs can be a good choice. Otherwise, we should be cautious when
countries are forming more and more RTAs, especially PTAs.
36

The distribution of the Sargan test is unknown when the disturbances are heteroskedastic, so the Sargan test is not
available if we specify robust standard errors. For non-robust estimation, the Sargan test is heteroskedasticityconsistent only for the two-step GMM. Hence, the Sargan test is based on the two-step procedure. Because this
paper covers a long time window (1960–2007), I have many GMM type instruments when using all the valid lags of
income per capita as instruments and the p-value for the Sargan test is usually very high. Restricting the GMM type
instruments for income per capita to only recent lags can produce significantly smaller p-values without failing the
test or overturning the main finding of this paper.
37
The within estimator is consistent only in fixed T and large N panels with all regressors being strictly exogenous.
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As a final note, the ex post analysis in this paper seeks to explain the effects of RTAs in
the past. The history of RTAs may be a poor guide for the future. Although I find a so far limited
contribution of RTAs to the growth of WTO members, RTAs in the future may be guided into
the right direction, for which we still need multilateral cooperation under the WTO.
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of growth rates against share of preferential exports (EXPsh_P)
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Notes: The annual growth rates in 2007 are based on the constant price GDP/capita data (chain series) from PWT. The calculated shares of preferential exports (EXPsh_P) are
from Carpenter and Lendle (2011). Countries are labeled by their ISO codes. Both figures use de facto WTO membership. Using formal membership produces nearly identical
diagrams. Among the 157 countries with data on both GDP/capita growth rates and EXPsh_P, only Bermuda is classified as a de facto WTO member but not a formal member in
2007.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable

Definitions

Obs.

Mean

S.D.

Min

log(rGDP/POP)
log(rGDP/POP)_l1
WTO_l1
FTAtradesh_l1
PTAtradesh_l1
FTAtradesh_nWTO_l1
FTAtradesh_WTO_l1
rGDPsh_l1
GSPexpsh_l1
log(I/GDP)
log(G/GDP)
log(gr_POP)
EXPsh_P
PM

Log(real GDP per capita)
Lagged log(rGDP/POP)
Lagged de facto WTO Member
Lagged FTA trade share
Lagged PTA trade share
Lagged FTA trade share not between WTO members
Lagged FTA trade share between WTO members
Lagged World share of real GDP
Lagged share of exports to GSP granting countries
Log(Investment/GDP)
Log(Government Spending/GDP)
Log(Population growth rate)
Share of exports that enjoy preferential tariffs
Preference margins

6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
6741
143
143

8.472
8.454
0.758
0.118
0.053
0.018
0.100
0.007
0.385
2.797
2.798
-4.147
0.310
0.347

1.163
1.159
0.428
0.224
0.117
0.081
0.215
0.023
0.344
0.722
0.536
0.916
0.253
0.470

5.032
5.032
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.201
0.098
-13.721
0
0

Max
11.624
11.624
1
1
0.798
0.818
1
0.322
1
4.633
4.467
-0.926
0.899
0.241

Notes: Most of the descriptive statistics are based on the sample of 6741 observations used in Table 2, except the last two variables at the bottom which are based on the sample
used in Panel II of Table 3. “X_l1” refers to the lagged value of a variable X by one year.
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Table 2: OLS and country fixed effects (FE) regression results

FTAtradesh_l1

(1)
OLS
0.001
(0.005)

(2)
FE
0.008
(0.007)

FTAtradesh_l1 * WTO_l1

(3)
OLS
0.027**
(0.012)
-0.032***
(0.012)

(4)
FE
0.043**
(0.019)
-0.041**
(0.018)

PTAtradesh_l1
PTAtradesh_l1 * WTO_l1

(5)
OLS
0.028**
(0.012)
-0.032***
(0.012)
0.007
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.017)

(6)
FE
0.045**
(0.019)
-0.040**
(0.018)
0.005
(0.023)
0.011
(0.022)

rGDPsh_l1
rGDPsh_l1 * WTO_l1
log(rGDP/POP)_l1
log(I/GDP)
log(G/GDP)
log(gr_POP)
WTO_l1
GSPexpsh_l1
Other covariates
R-squared
Observations
F-test for b1+b2=0 [p-value]

0.994***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.003)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
0.006
(0.005)
Yes
0.997
6,741

0.962***
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.008)
-0.028***
(0.007)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.008
(0.006)
0.961
6,741

0.994***
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
Yes
0.997
6,741
[0.368]

0.962***
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.008)
-0.028***
(0.007)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.001
(0.004)
0.007
(0.006)
0.961
6,741
[0.815]

0.994***
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.006*
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
Yes
0.997
6,741
[0.414]

0.961***
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.008)
-0.028***
(0.007)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.004)
0.007
(0.006)
0.961
6,741
[0.585]

(7)
OLS
0.030**
(0.012)
-0.035***
(0.013)

(8)
FE
0.043**
(0.019)
-0.040**
(0.018)

0.218
(0.145)
-0.225
(0.140)
0.994***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.006*
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
Yes
0.997
6,741
[0.323]

0.539
(0.530)
-0.148
(0.219)
0.961***
(0.005)
0.016**
(0.008)
-0.029***
(0.006)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.000
(0.004)
0.006
(0.007)
0.961
6,741
[0.619]

Notes: The dependent variable is log(rGDP/POP). “X_l1” refers to the lagged value of a variable X by one year. Year dummies are included in all of the regressions. “Other
covariates” include the following time-invariant variables: region dummies, legal origin dummies, a dummy for least developed countries, and a dummy for OPEC countries.
These variables are not shown on the table to save space. The test for b1+b2=0 [p-value] provides the p-values for the test of the H0 that the first two coefficients sum to zero.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Robustness checks

FTAtradesh_WTO_l1
FTAtradesh_nWTO_l1

Panel I
(1)
(2)
OLS
FE
-0.005
0.000
(0.005)
(0.007)
0.024**
0.045**
(0.011)
(0.019)

EXPsh_P

Panel II
(3)
Cross Section

(4)
Cross Section

Panel III
(6)
Drop LDC

(7)
Drop OPEC

0.055
(0.036)
-0.092**
(0.038)

EXPsh_P * WTO
PM

0.301*
(0.154)
-0.568***
(0.195)

PM * WTO
FTAtradesh_l1
FTAtradesh_l1 * WTO_l1
Year dummies
Country fixed effects
R-squared
Observations
F-test for b1+b2=0 [p-value]

(5) Drop
Micro states

Yes
0.997
6,741

Yes
Yes
0.961
6,741

0.999
143
[0.034]

0.999
143
[0.027]

0.044*
(0.023)
-0.046**
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
0.968
4,494
[0.814]

0.044*
(0.023)
-0.040*
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
0.970
4,845
[0.511]

0.051**
(0.024)
-0.050**
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
0.966
6,249
[0.816]

Notes: The dependent variable is log(rGDP/POP). “X_l1” refers to the lagged value of a variable X by one year. The following covariates are included in all of the regressions but
not shown on the table to save space: log(rGDP/POP)_l1, log(I/GDP), log(G/GDP), log(gr_POP), WTO_l1, and GSPexpsh_l1. The following time-invariant variables are also
included in the OLS regressions: region dummies, legal origin dummies, a dummy for least developed countries, and a dummy for OPEC countries. These variables are not shown
on the table to save space. FTAtradesh_WTO measures a WTO member’s FTA trade share with other WTO members in a given year (zero for a non-WTO member).
FTAtradesh_nWTO measures a country’s FTA trade share not between WTO members in a given year (i.e., when either this country or its FTA partners are outside the WTO).
EXPsh_P is the share of exports that enjoy preferential tariffs. PM is the calculated preference margin. These variables are explained in Section 4.1. Regression (5) drops
microstates with average real GDP over 1960-2007 less than 10 million USD in constant 2005 price. Regression (6) drops the least developed countries (UNCTAD definition).
Regression (7) drops the OPEC countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Endogeneity of FTAs

FTAtradesh_l1
FTAtradesh_l1 * WTO_l1
log(rGDP/POP)_l1
log(I/GDP)
log(G/GDP)
log(gr_POP)
WTO_l1
GSPexpsh_l1
Contagion_l1
Contagion_l1 * WTO_l1
Observations
F-statistics of excluded IVs
F-test for b1+b2=0 [p-value]
Test for 1st order AC [p-value]
Test for 2nd order AC [p-value]

2SLS (with country FEs)
(1)
(2)
(3)
1st Stage: WTO
1st Stage:
2nd Stage
FTAtradesh * FTAtradesh
0.226***
(0.070)
-0.151***
(0.039)
0.030***
0.022***
0.960***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.003)
-0.004
-0.002
0.017***
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.003)
-0.009
-0.010*
-0.027***
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.004)
-0.008***
-0.008***
-0.004**
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
0.032***
0.011
0.004
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.005)
-0.149***
-0.142***
0.018*
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.010)
181.210***
91.121***
(18.350)
(17.015)
9.897***
62.597***
(3.586)
(3.325)
6,741
6,741
6,741
58.32
212.74
[0.170]

0.116***
(0.035)
-0.103**
(0.041)
0.989***
(0.010)
0.020*
(0.011)
-0.051***
(0.014)
-0.009**
(0.004)
0.011
(0.011)
0.009
(0.014)

System GMM Method
(5)
(6)
Endo(FTA
Endo(FTA)
&WTO)
0.094***
0.109***
(0.027)
(0.028)
-0.085**
-0.104***
(0.035)
(0.036)
0.986***
0.987***
(0.007)
(0.007)
0.022**
0.021**
(0.009)
(0.009)
-0.046***
-0.048***
(0.011)
(0.012)
-0.008**
-0.008**
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.007
0.013
(0.009)
(0.010)
0.005
0.006
(0.012)
(0.012)

(7)
Endo(FTA)
& Extra IVs
0.106***
(0.028)
-0.099***
(0.036)
0.986***
(0.007)
0.021**
(0.009)
-0.047***
(0.012)
-0.008**
(0.004)
0.012
(0.010)
0.006
(0.012)

6,675

6,675

6,675

6,675

[0.505]
[0.000]
[0.255]

[0.640]
[0.000]
[0.251]

[0.807]
[0.000]
[0.250]

[0.720]
[0.000]
[0.250]

(4)
Baseline

Notes: The dependent variable is log(rGDP/POP). “X_l1” refers to the lagged value of a variable X by one year. Year dummies are included in all of the regressions and country
fixed effects are included in the 2SLS regression. The instrument (Contagion) for FTAtradesh in the 2SLS regression is defined as the average FTAtradesh of all of the trading
partners of a country (after excluding this country’s own FTA trade) Weighted by 1/log(distance). Regression (4) uses all valid lags of the lagged income variable as GMM type
instruments, with all other covariates taken as exogenous. Regression (5) takes FTA and WTO related variables as endogenous and uses their first two valid lags as GMM type
instruments besides all valid lags of the lagged income variable used as instruments for the lagged income variable. Regression (6) is similar to regression (5) but only takes FTA
related variables as endogenous. Regression (7) is the same as regression (6) except that it uses Contagion and Contagion*WTO as additional standard instruments for FTA related
variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

36

Appendix 1: List of 177 counties and regions covered in the growth regressions
Afghanistan
Central Afr. Rep. (1961)
Ghana (1960)
Lesotho (1961)
Panama (1998)
Suriname (1971)
Albania (2001)
Chad (1961)
Greece (1960)
Liberia
Papua New Guinea (1975)
Swaziland (1971)
Algeria (1961)
Chile (1960)
Grenada (1971)
Libya
Paraguay (1994)
Sweden (1960)
Angola (1971)
China (2002)
Guatemala (1992)
Luxembourg (1960)
Peru (1960)
Switzerland (1960)
Antigua & Barbuda (1977)
Colombia (1976)
Guinea (1960)
Macao (1971)
Philippines (1973)
Syria
Argentina (1962)
Comoros (1969)
Guinea-Bissau (1962)
Macedonia (2003)
Poland (1971)
Taiwan (2005)
Australia (1960)
Congo, Dem. (1960)
Guyana (1971)
Madagascar (1961)
Portugal (1963)
Tajikistan
Austria (1960)
Congo, Rep. (1961)
Haiti (1961)
Malawi (1965)
Qatar (1971)
Tanzania (1961)
Azerbaijan
Costa Rica (1991)
Honduras (1994)
Malaysia (1960)
Romania (1972)
Thailand (1983)
Bahamas (1971)
Cote D Ivoire (1961)
Hong Kong (1961)
Maldives (1971)
Russia
Togo (1961)
Bahrain (1971)
Croatia (2001)
Hungary (1974)
Mali (1961)
Rwanda (1965)
Tonga (1971)
Bangladesh (1973)
Cuba (1971)
Iceland (1964)
Malta (1973)
St. Kitts & Nevis (2003)
Trinidad & Tobago (1960)
Barbados (1963)
Cyprus (1960)
India (1960)
Mauritania (1961)
St. Lucia (1977)
Tunisia (1962)
Belgium (1960)
Czech Rep. (1994)
Indonesia (1961)
Mauritius (1960)
St. Vincent & Gren. (1977)
Turkey (1960)
Belize (1971)
Denmark (1960)
Iran
Mexico (1987)
Samoa
Turkmenistan
Benin (1961)
Djibouti (1971)
Iraq
Moldova
Sao Tome & Principe (1971)
Uganda (1960)
Bermuda (1971)
Dominica (1977)
Ireland (1968)
Mongolia (1997)
Saudi Arabia (2006)
UAE (1971)
Bhutan
Dominican Rep. (1960)
Israel (1960)
Morocco (1987)
Senegal (1961)
UK (1960)
Bolivia (1991)
Ecuador (1996)
Italy (1960)
Mozambique (1962)
Serbia & Montenegro
USA (1960)
Bosnia & Herzeg.
Egypt (1963)
Jamaica (1962)
Namibia (1967)
Seychelles (1970)
Uruguay (1960)
Botswana (1970)
El Salvador (1991)
Japan (1960)
Nepal (2004)
Sierra Leone (1962)
Uzbekistan
Brazil (1960)
Equ. Guinea (1963)
Jordan (2000)
Netherlands (1960)
Singapore (1961)
Vanuatu
Brunei (1971)
Eritrea
Kazakhstan
New Zealand (1960)
Slovakia (1994)
Venezuela (1991)
Bulgaria
Ethiopia
Kenya (1960)
Nicaragua (1960)
Slovenia (1995)
Vietnam (2007)
Burkina Faso (1961)
Fiji (1961)
Kiribati (1971)
Niger (1961)
Solomon Islands (1971)
Yemen, Rep. (1990)
Burundi (1964)
Finland (1960)
Korea, South (1967)
Nigeria (1960)
Somalia
Zambia (1960)
Cambodia (1972)
France (1960)
Kuwait (1971)
Norway (1960)
South Africa (1960)
Zimbabwe (1960)
Cameroon (1961)
Gabon (1961)
Kyrgyzstan (1999)
Oman (2001)
Spain (1964)
Canada (1960)
Gambia (1961)
Laos
Pakistan (1960)
Sri Lanka (1960)
Cape Verde (1962)
Germany, Fed. (1971)
Lebanon
Palau
Sudan
Notes: This table lists the countries covered by the regressions in Table 2. De factor GATT/WTO entry years are in parentheses, except for the countries or
regions that were still outside the WTO by 2007 (including those entered after 2007 such as Russia). For countries and regions that entered the GATT/WTO
before July 1 of a year, the following year is taken as the entry year.
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Appendix 2: RTAs used to construct the RTA trade share variables (Total: 270)
ACM
ACS*
AFTA
AMU
Albania- Moldova
Albania-Bosnia & Herzeg.
Albania-Macedonia
Albania-Serbia Mont.
Arab Free Trade Area
Armenia-Canada*
Armenia-Cyprus
Armenia-Estonia
Armenia-Kazakhstan
Armenia-Moldova
Armenia-Russian
Armenia- Turkmenistan
Armenia- Ukraine
BAFTA
Bangkok Agreement*
Bangkok Agreement-China*
Belarus-Ukraine
Bolivia-Chile
Bosnia & Herzeg.-Serbia Mont.
Bulgaria-Albania
Bulgaria-Estonia
Bulgaria-Israel
Bulgaria-Latvia
Bulgaria-Lithuania
Bulgaria-Macedonia
Bulgaria-Turkey
Bhutan-India
CACM
CACM-Chile
CACM-Costa Rica
CAFTA-Dominican Rep.
CAN
CARICOM
CARICOM-Cuba

Czech-Israel
Czech-Latvia
Czech-Lithuania
Czech-Slovak
Czech-Turkey
Dominica-Costa Rica
Dominica-El Salvador
Dominica-Guatemala
Dominica-Honduras
EAC*
EAEC
EC
EC-Albania
EC-Algeria
EC-Andorra
EC-Bulgaria
EC-Chile
EC-Croatia
EC-Cyprus*
EC-Czech
EC-Egypt
EC-Estonia
EC-Macedonia
EC-Faroe Islands
EC-Hungary
EC-Iceland
EC-Israel
EC-Jordan
EC-Latvia
EC-Lebanon
EC-Lithuania
EC-Malta
EC-Mexico
EC-Morocco
EC-Norway
EC-OCTs
EC-Poland
EC-Romania

EFTA-Singapore
EFTA-Slovak
EFTA-Slovenia
EFTA-Turkey
EFTA-West Bank
Egypt-Turkey*
El Salvador-Mexico
Estonia-Faroe Islands
Estonia-Turkey
Estonia-Ukraine
Faroe Islands-Iceland
Faroe Islands-Norway
Faroe Islands-Switzerland
G3
GCC*
GSTP*
Georgia-Armenia
Georgia-Azerbaijan
Georgia-Kazakhstan
Georgia-Russia
Georgia-Turkmenistan
Georgia-Ukraine
Guatemala-Mexico
Honduras-Mexico
Hungary-Estonia
Hungary-Israel
Hungary-Latvia
Hungary-Lithuania
Hungary-Turkey
IOR-ARC*
India-Afghanistan*
India-Sri Lanka
Japan-Malaysia
Japan-Mexico
Japan-Singapore
Jordan-Singapore
Kyrgyz-Armenia
Kyrgyz-Kazakhstan

Pakistan-China
Pakistan-Sri Lanka*
Pan-Arab Free Trade
Panama-El Salvador
Panama-Singapore
Panama-Taiwan
Poland-Faroe Islands
Poland-Israel
Poland-Latvia
Poland-Lithuania
Poland-Turkey
Korea-Singapore
Romania-Moldova
SACU
SADC
SAFTA*
SAPTA*
SPARTECA*
Serbia Mont.-Bulgaria
Serbia-Mont.-Romania
Singapore-Australia
Slovak-Estonia
Slovak-Israel
Slovak-Latvia
Slovak-Lithuania
Slovak-Turkey
Slovenia-Bosnia & Herzeg.
Slovenia-Croatia
Slovenia-Estonia
Slovenia-Israel
Slovenia-Latvia
Slovenia-Lithuania
Slovenia-Macedonia
Switzerland-Armenia
TRIPARTITE*
Thailand- Australia
Thailand- New Zealand
Trans-Pacific SEP
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CARICOM-Bahamas
CARICOM-Colombia*
CARICOM-Costa Rica
CBI*
CEFTA
CEPGL
CER
CEZ
CIS
COMESA*
Canada-Chile
Canada-Costa Rica
Canada-Israel
Chana-Burkina Faso
Chile-China
Chile-Colombia
Chile-Costa Rica
Chile-Ecuador
Chile-El Salvador
Chile-Korea
Chile-Mexico
Chile-Venezuela
China-Hong Kong
China-Macao
Colombia-Mexico
Croatia-Macedonia
Croatia-Serbia & Mont.
Croatia- Bosnia & Herzeg.
Croatia-Albania
Czech-Estonia

EC-Slovak
EC-Slovenia
EC-South Africa
EC-Switzerland
EC-Syria
EC-Turkey
EC-Tunisia
ECCAS
ECO*
ECOWAS
EFTA
EFTA-Chile
EFTA-Lebanon
EFTA-Korea
EFTA-Tunisia
EFTA-Bulgaria
EFTA-Croatia
EFTA-Czech
EFTA-Estonia
EFTA-Finland
EFTA-Hungary
EFTA-Israel
EFTA-Jordan
EFTA-Latvia
EFTA-Lithuania
EFTA-Macedonia
EFTA-Mexico
EFTA-Morocco
EFTA-Poland
EFTA-Romania

Kyrgyz-Moldova
Kyrgyz-Russia
Kyrgyz-Ukraine
Kyrgyz-Uzbekistan
LAIA*
Laos-Thailand*
MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR-Bolivia
MERCOSUR-Chile
MRU
MSG*
Macedonia-Bosnia & Herzeg.
Mexico-Nicaragua
Mexico-Uruguay
Mexico-Bolivia
Mexico-Costa Rica
Mexico-Israel
Moldova-Bulgaria
Moldova-Croatia
Moldova-Macedonia
Moldova-Serbia and Mont.
Moldova- Bosnia & Herzeg.
Morocco-Turkey
NAFTA
New Zealand-Singapore
OECS*
PAFTA
PATCRA
PICTA*
PTN*

Turkey-Syria
Turkey-Tunisia
Turkey-Bosnia & Herzeg.
Turkey-Croatia
Turkey-Israel
Turkey-Latvia
Turkey-Lithuania
Turkey-Macedonia
Turkey-Romania
Turkey-Slovenia
US-Canada
US-Chile
US-Israel
US-Jordan
US-Singapore
Ukraine-Azerbaijan
Ukraine-Kazakhstan
Ukraine-Macedonia
Ukraine-Moldova
Ukraine-Russia
Ukraine-Tajikistan
Ukraine -Turkmenistan
US-Albania
US-Australia
US-Bahrain
US-Vietnam
US-Morocco
WAEMU*

Data Sources: (1) WTO: http://www.WTO.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. (2) WTO Archive, WTO, Geneva, Switzerland. (3) Frankel (1997). Regional Trading Blocs.
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. (4) Schiff and Winters (2003). Regional Integration and Development. Washington, DC: Oxford University Press. (5)
Foreign Trade Information System: http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp. (6) Tuck School Global Preferential Trade Agreement Database:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~tradedb/library.php. (7) McGill Preferential Trade Agreement Database: http://ptas.mcgill.ca/Pages%20ptas/A-Z/A.htm
Notes: Trade agreements followed by a “*”are partial-scope agreements (PTAs). All others are either free trade areas or customs unions, which are referred to together as FTAs.
Service agreements and accession agreements to existing agreements (e.g., EC) are not displayed or counted separately. An agreement that has entered into force before July 1 of a
year is considered as effective in that year, and considered effective in the following year otherwise. Agreements between EC and some Central and Eastern European nations refer
to the earlier FTAs before they entered the EU.
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